to 400 B.C. , only became part of mathematics and information theory this century, in the late 1940s, mainly due to the seminal papers of Shannon [1] . Today, one can briefly define cryptography as a mathematical system of transforming information so that it is unintelligible and therefore useless to those who are not meant to have access to it. However, as the computational process associated with transforming the information is always performed by physical means, one cannot separate the mathematical structure from the underlying laws of physics that govern the process of computation [2] . Deutsch has shown that quantum physics enriches our computational possibilities far beyond classical Turing machines [2] , and current work in quantum cryptography originated by Bennett and Brassard provides a good example of this fact [3] .
In this paper I will present a method in which the security of the so-called key distribution process in cryptography depends on the completeness of quantum mechanics.
Here completeness means that quantum description provides maximum possible information about any system under consideration. 
where n, and nb are two unit vectors (for particles a and b, respectively), oriented along the directions of the quantization axes for which the eavesdropper acquired information about the spin component of a given particle.
This information could be acquired either through a direct, "brute" measurement of the spin components or through a more subtle attack on the source, e.g. , substituting a source that produces a state of two spin-2 particles correlated with another quantum system on which the actual measurement will be performed by the eavesdropper. The normalized probability measure p(n"nb) describes the eavesdropper strategy (probability of intercepting a spin component along a given direction for a particular measurement).
If only one particle (say, a)
is exposed to the measurement performed by the eavesdropper along the direction n"one may put nb = -n, as a particular case in Eq. (5 
